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Since 2013, The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation is offered to 
the families of deceased solid organ donors in the United Kingdom to honor 
the donors and inspire others to donate. We evaluate the effects of this 
award using a difference-in-differences approach that builds on the fact that 
solid organ donors are eligible for the award, while cornea-only donors are 
not. We find that the introduction of the award led to an increase in the 
number of deceased solid organ donors, as well as in the general 
willingness to register as solid organ donors when alive. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Order of St John together with the National Health Service (NHS) Blood 
and Transplant introduced The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation in the 
United Kingdom. This non-monetary award, which takes the form of a	pin badge and a 
scroll, is given to the families of deceased solid organ donors as recognition of the 
generosity of the donor at public award ceremonies. An additional explicitly stated 
purpose of the award is to raise awareness of the importance of solid organ donation and 
inspire others to follow in the honored donors’ footsteps (NHS-St John, 2016). To the 
best of our knowledge, this award represents the first nationwide official recognition for 
deceased organ donors in any country. Previous awards have either been ad hoc in 
nature or granted by individual hospitals (Gardiner and Denby, 2015). 
We use the introduction of the award to study the incentivizing effects of posthumous 
recognition on organ donation. There is ample theoretical ground for believing that 
awards can spur solid organ donation among both living and deceased potential donors. 
Niederle and Roth (2014) survey a representative sample of adults in the United States 
to collect approval rates of various policies that reward living kidney donors. They find 
that a policy that rewards a kidney donor with a medal of heroism and a monetary prize 
(provided by a private foundation rather than taxpayers) has the significantly highest 
approval. Woodfine and Redelmeier (2014) argue that an increased level of non-
monetary public recognition of the family members of deceased organ donors in the 
United States could inspire others in the community to consent to organ donation. 
To estimate to what extent posthumous non-monetary public recognition initiatives can 
incentivize solid organ donation, we use a difference-in-differences approach around the 
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introduction of The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation. We have natural 
treatment and control groups since this award is given only to commemorate those who 
donated solid organs––e.g. heart, kidneys, liver, lungs or pancreas––whereas tissue 
donation and eye-only donation (cornea) are not recognized under this scheme. While 
cornea and tissue transplantations can have a dramatic effect on a patient’s quality of 
life, they are not considered lifesaving (Gaum et al., 2012) and, as such, were not 
included in this award scheme. Accordingly, in our analysis, the treatment group 
consists of deceased donors of solid organs and the control group consists of deceased 
donors of cornea who did not donate any solid organ. Our difference-in-differences 
analysis suggests that the award has produced two important effects: An increase in the 
number of deceased solid organ donors and an increase in the willingness to donate 
solid organs among the population that has registered as donors. 
Our results contribute to the literature on successful policy incentives put in place to 
increase the supply of transplantable organs. Stoler et al. (2017) include a recent 
overview of such policies, which for example include systems where individuals are 
considered organ donors unless they actively opt out (Horvat et al., 2010), priority 
schemes for registered organ donors (Kessler and Roth, 2012, 2014), financial 
compensation to the donor or the donor’s family (Friedman, 2006), and organ exchange 
(Roth et al., 2004). Understanding which policies can spur organ donation is of course 
important beyond the academic discourse, as there is a global shortage of organs (Stoler 
et al., 2017). Our study also contributes to the literature on the incentivizing effects of 
official non-monetary awards. A growing number of empirical papers have documented 
that a bestowing body can push individuals to outperform along desired dimensions 
through awards. For example, Ager et al. (2018) find that bravery awards can trigger 
4 
	
fighter pilots to take more risks in combat while Raff and Siming (2016) show that 
governments can use knighthoods to induce business leaders to uphold an excessive 
number of employees. This study contributes to the literature on honors and awards by 
being the first to show that even posthumous awards can have an incentivizing effect in 
increasing the output targeted by the bestowing body. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Currently, organ donation in the United Kingdom is conducted through an opt-in 
system.1 An individual who wishes to donate her organs can register with the NHS 
Organ Donor Register. The family members of a registered donor will be consulted 
after the person’s death to ensure that she had not changed her mind after registration 
and to give their final consent to the organ donation. The United Kingdom organ 
donation legislation states that consent lies with the deceased, but, in practice, relatives’ 
wishes are respected if they do not consent to the organ donation (Vincent and Logan, 
2012). The family’s consent is also sought in case the deceased was not registered as a 
donor. According to the NHS Blood and Transplant Organ Donation and 
Transplantation Activity Report, as of 2017, 36% of the population had registered as 
donors and the average family consent rate to organ donations was equal to 63%.2 
																																								 																				
1 Since December 2015, Wales operates under a presumed consent system (soft opt-out) where deceased 
adults are deemed to have consented to organ donation unless they had positively opted out before their 
death. We will account for this in our empirical analysis. Changes to an opt-out system are currently 
(October 2018) under discussion in both the British and Scottish Parliaments. 
2 Available from http://www.odt.nhs.uk/statistics-and-reports/annual-activity-report/. 
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In December 2006, The Government set up the Organ Donation Taskforce to 
recommend actions needed to increase organ donation. As one of the recommendations, 
the taskforce in 2008 called for appropriate ways of recognizing individual donors 
(Organ Donation Taskforce, 2008). Subsequently, in 2013, the Order of St John––an 
order of Chivalry which is also the United Kingdom’s leading provider of first-aid 
services––entered into a partnership with NHS Blood and Transplant––who has the 
country’s public responsibility for optimizing the supply of blood, organs, and tissues––
to launch The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation. The award is intended to 
not only honor donors, but also raise awareness of organ donation and inspire other 
families to follow the donors’ example by becoming donors themselves (NHS-St John, 
2016). 
The award, which is depicted in Figure 1, is wearable in the form of a pin and is offered 
by invitation to all families in the United Kingdom whose relative donated a solid organ 
after death. The award is open to people of all faiths or no faith. The concept of the 
award was modeled on The Elizabeth Cross (Gardiner and Denby, 2015), which is a 
posthumous award given to the next of kin of members of the British Armed Forces 
killed in action. The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation, together with a scroll, 
is awarded posthumously to donors and accepted on their behalf by relatives at an 
official regional ceremony. In 2014, 65% of the families of deceased solid organ donors 
accepted the offer to participate to the ceremony and receive the award. Those 
ceremonies have generally attracted a significant level of media publicity.3 
 
																																								 																				
3 Information from http://odt.nhs.uk/pdf/advisory_group_papers/NODC/Order_of_St_John_Award_for_ 
organ_Donation_Report.pdf accessed on 7 December, 2017. 
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3. METHOD 
To analyze if a non-monetary posthumous award can incentivize organ donation we 
gather data on deceased solid organ and cornea-only donors in the United Kingdom 
over the years 2010 to 2017 from the annual issues of the NHS Blood and Transplant 
Organ Donation and Transplantation Activity Reports.4 The treatment group consists of 
deceased donors where at least one solid organ was recovered for the purpose of 
transplantation and the control group consists of deceased donors where only corneas 
were recovered for the purpose of transplantation. Some of the donors in the treatment 
group may have also donated their corneas, but none of the donors in the control group 
donated a solid organ. We therefore refer to the treatment (control) group as solid organ 
(cornea-only) donors. We use the data to estimate the following model of deceased 
donors: 
Yt,i = Post award + Treatment group + d(Treatment group × Post award) + et,i    (1) 
where Yt,i is the natural logarithm of deceased donors during year t in group i. The two 
groups i are the treatment and control groups. For the treatment (control) group Y is the 
log of the number of deceased solid organ (cornea-only) donors from 1 April to 31 
March in each year. The first year in which the award is in place is the one ending on 31 
March 2014. The period-specific dummy variable Post award measures the common 
shocks to the two groups in the pre-award and post-award periods. It is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for each year that the award system is in place 
(2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017), and zero otherwise (2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013). Thus, 
																																								 																				
4 Available from http://www.odt.nhs.uk/statistics-and-reports/annual-activity-report/ accessed on 7 
December, 2017. Data on soft tissue other than cornea are not available. 
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Post award controls for nation-wide shocks and trends that shape the dependent 
variables over time in the United Kingdom, such as the overall number of deceased 
individuals, general medical progress or general health-care policy changes.5 The 
dummy variable Treatment group, which equals one for solid organ donors and zero for 
cornea-only donors, accounts for time-invariant differences in the number of donations 
due to group-specific factors. By including these indicator variables in the model, all of 
the common time variation and the cross-sectional variation across groups are removed. 
The interaction Treatment group × Post award is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one for the treatment group for each year that the award system is in place (i.e., 
after year 2013), and zero otherwise. Thus, the coefficient d is the difference-in-
differences estimator that measures the change in the outcome variable stemming from 
the introduction of The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation. This estimator 
shows the changes in the number of solid organ donors following the introduction of the 
award, controlling for changes in the dependent variable among cornea-only donors, 
which are unaffected by the award. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Impact on solid organ donations 
																																								 																				
5 For example, in addition to the recommendation of granting appropriate recognition to individual 
donors, the Organ Donation Taskforce issued 12 suggestions (Organ Donation Taskforce, 2008) 
regarding funding, organizational improvements, data monitoring, training of donation teams, increasing 
awareness among medical staff and the general public. While several of the suggestions were 
implemented, none of them focused solely on solid organ or cornea donation. Therefore, we expect their 
effects to be captured by this period dummy.  
8 
	
 
In Figure 2 we plot the number of deceased solid organ and cornea-only donors by year. 
The upper panel shows the raw number of deceased donors while the lower panel shows 
normalized values with year 2010 as the start year. We first note that the number of 
solid organ donors is lower than the number of cornea-only donors throughout the 
sample period. Importantly, while the trends up to the introduction are similar for both 
groups, we note a diverging pattern in the number of donors after the introduction of the 
award, as only solid organ donors continue to increase from that point onwards. An 
important assumption of specification (1) is that the error term et,i is uncorrelated with 
the time period and the group indicator variables. Essentially, the trend in terms of 
number of solid organ donors should not differ from the trend in terms of number of 
cornea-only donors before the award is introduced. The plot in Figure 2 suggests that 
this is indeed the case, which confirms the appropriateness of using deceased cornea-
only donors as a control group. 
The first column of Table 1 shows the estimates of the difference-in-differences model 
(1). The coefficient of the interaction term Treatment group × Post award represents the 
increase in the logarithmic outcome variable for a change in the indicator variable from 
zero to one. Hence, the estimated coefficient of 0.222 translates into a change of 100 × 
(exp0.222 – 1), or an increase of 25% in deceased solid organ donors over the years 2014 
to 2017 with respect to the change in cornea-only donors. The coefficient is significant 
at the 5% level. This estimate suggests that the award has a large positive impact on the 
supply of solid organs from deceased donors. 
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As mentioned in Section 2, Wales operates under a presumed consent system since 
December 2015. To ensure that the results are not driven by this change, we re-estimate 
regression (1) after removing all observations that relate to Wales and report the 
estimates in the second column of Table 1.6 The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
term Treatment group × Post award of 0.226 translates into an increase of 25% in 
deceased solid organ donors after the introduction of the award compared to the change 
in cornea-only donors. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level. We conclude that 
the 2015 change in the Welsh organ donation system cannot explain away our main 
findings. 
In order to argue that the introduction of the award has played a significant role in 
explaining the relative increase in solid organ donations, we have to rule out alternative 
channels. The most plausible competing explanation is medical progress in solid organ 
retrieval. Compared to solid organs, cornea retrieval for transplantation is considerably 
easier due to the longer post-mortem time span over which the organ can be recovered 
(hours or days for corneas versus minutes for solid organs), a less complicated recovery 
procedure and a longer life span of the organ between retrieval and transplant (see 
Guam et al., 2012; Osband et al., 2016). Under the hypothesis that, upon either brain or 
circulatory death, individuals are screened for potential donation of any type of organ 
(solid or cornea), medical progress in solid organ retrieval in the Post award period 
would likely translate into a redistribution of donors from cornea-only (control group) 
to solid organs (treatment group, which includes donors of solid organs and cornea).  
																																								 																				
6 The number of deceased Welsh cornea-only donors is missing from the activity report of 2017. The 
NHS Blood and Transplant kindly provided us with the number of corneas donated in that year by type of 
donor and geographical area, from which we were able to estimate the missing observation. 
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To assess whether this could drive our findings, we retrieve information on the donation 
process of solid organs from the annual NHS Blood and Transplant Organ Donation and 
Transplantation Activity Reports. The first step of the process is the identification, made 
by clinicians, of eligible donors, i.e. patients for whom death was confirmed following 
neurological tests (for brain death) or who had treatment withdrawn (for circulatory 
death) and had no absolute medical contraindications to solid organ donation. Once 
eligible donors are identified, specialized clinical staff is expected to approach the 
family of the deceased to ask for consent to organ donation. If family consent is granted, 
the retrieval of solid organs can take place. Table 2 shows the average percentage of 
success at each step of the donation process over the periods before (Pre award) and 
after (Post award) the introduction of the award, i.e. the proportion of eligible donors 
over audited deaths, the proportion of eligible donors whose family was approached for 
donation, the family consent rate, and the percentage of cases where solid organs were 
successfully retrieved following family consent.7  
If medical progress played a crucial role in driving up the number of solid organ donors 
Post award, we would expect the proportion of eligible donors over audited deaths and, 
most importantly, the percentage of successful donations over donors for which consent 
was granted, to increase substantially in the second period compared to the first. 
However, we record a modest increase (from 14.3% to 15.8%) in the first indicator and 
a slight decrease (from 68.7% to 68.1%) in the second. Instead, we observe an 
important increase (from 56.6% to 60.4%) in the family consent rate to solid organ 
																																								 																				
7 The average over the Pre award period is computed over three years (2011, 2012 and 2013) as the 
procedure for recording information on the donation process changed in 2010, and data for that year are 
not directly comparable. 
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donation, which is the only step in the process directly affected by the award scheme. 
Unfortunately, separate consent rates for solid organ and cornea-only donations are not 
available, hence we cannot perform a difference-in-differences analysis of consent rates 
around the introduction of the award. Given that there is no indication from Table 2 that 
medical advances in the retrieval of solid organs may have significantly contributed to 
narrowing the gap with respect to cornea retrieval, the relative increase in solid organ 
donations compared to cornea-only donations likely stems from an increase in the 
consent rate for the former compared to the latter, which is consistent with the 
incentives provided by the award.  
 
4.2. Impact on organ donor registrations 
We further examine the incentivizing role of the Order of St John Award for Organ 
Donation by investigating if the willingness––when alive––to opt in the NHS Organ 
Donor Register to donate solid organs has been affected by the award. As described in 
Section 2, organ donation in the United Kingdom is currently conducted through an opt-
in system. However, a number of those who opt in are restricted donors, i.e. unwilling 
to donate one or more specific organs. Naturally, any donor unwilling to donate one or 
more solid organs has a reduced probability of receiving the award. If the award spurs 
the willingness to donate solid organs, we would expect a reduction in the number of 
restrictions that relate to solid organs among the registered donors, compared to those 
that relate to corneas. 
We gather data on the restrictions towards solid organ and cornea donations in the 
United Kingdom over the years 2010 to 2017 from the annual issues of the NHS Blood 
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and Transplant Organ Donation and Transplantation Activity Reports. The average 
percentage of unrestricted donors (out of all individuals registered in the National Organ 
Register) is 88%. When we look closer at the unwillingness to donate specific organs, 
some interesting patterns emerge. Figure 3 plots the percentage of donors who are not 
prepared to donate a specific organ, for each year in our sample period. We observe two 
patterns when we look at the trends before and after the introduction of the award: 
While there is a slightly increasing trend in donors who specifically opt out of cornea 
donations, the trends for donors who refuse to donate one of the solid organs are mostly 
downward sloping. In Table 3, we formally test these trends. We employ the same 
estimation strategy as in (1) in a set of repeated difference-in-differences regressions 
where the control group is always the natural logarithm of all living registrants not 
prepared to donate their corneas, but where the treatment group is, in turn, the natural 
logarithm of all living registrants not prepared to donate their kidneys, pancreas, heart, 
lungs, and liver, respectively. As before, all data relate to the year from 1 April to 31 
March, standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, period- and group-specific 
dummy variables are employed, and the key variable of interest is the interaction 
between the treatment group and the period after the award was introduced.  
We see from Table 3 that the coefficient of the interaction term, Treatment group × Post 
award, is negative and statistically significant for pancreas, heart and liver, suggesting 
that the unwillingness to donate any of these solid organs has decreased compared to the 
unwillingness to donate corneas after the introduction of the award. The interaction 
coefficient for kidneys and lungs is also negative, but not statistically significant. We 
interpret the findings reported in Table 3 as an indication that the introduction of the 
award overall spurred an increased willingness to register to become solid organ donors. 
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The effect is however weaker compared to the direct impact estimated on actual solid 
organ donations.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Using the 2013 introduction of The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation in the 
United Kingdom, we are able to make an important contribution to the literature on 
policies that can incentivize organ donation. We show that the introduction of the award 
has led to an increase in the number of deceased solid organ donors and, to a lesser 
extent, in the willingness to register as solid organ donors. 
Our results suggest that it is possible to incentivize organ donation through schemes of 
official recognition of the deceased donor. Consequently, policy makers outside the 
United Kingdom may want to consider establishing official awards for organ donation 
in a spirit similar to The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation as a means, 
among others, of reducing the current shortage of transplantable solid organs. 
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Figure 1. The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation 
 
Notes. Picture of The Order of St John Award for Organ Donation obtained from 
Gardiner and Denby (2015), p. 26.  
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Figure 2. Deceased Donors per Year 
	  
	  
Notes. The upper panel plots the number of deceased solid organ donors (treatment 
group) and the number of deceased cornea-only donors (control group) by year. In the 
lower panel, these numbers are normalized to a starting value of one for the year 2010. 
The vertical lines indicate the break between the pre-award and post-award periods. 
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Figure 3. Unwillingness of Registered Donors to Donate Specific Organs 
 
Notes. This figure plots by year the percentages of registered donors that are not willing 
to donate a specific organ. Cornea restrictions are measured on the left-hand axis and 
solid organ restrictions are measured on the right-hand axis. The vertical line indicates 
the break between the pre-award and post-award periods. 
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Table 1. Estimated Impact of Award on Deceased Donors 
 Natural logarithm of deceased donors 
 Full sample Excluding Wales 
Treatment group × Post award 0.222** 0.226** 
 (0.078) (0.079) 
Treatment group -0.869*** -0.893*** 
 (0.071) (0.072) 
Post award 0.012 0.018 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
Constant 7.838*** 7.800*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) 
Observations 16 16 
R-squared 0.971 0.971 
 
Notes. This table presents the results of a difference-in-differences regression of the 
(log) number of deceased organ donors over the sample period 2010 to 2017. Post 
award is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for each year that the award 
system is in place (2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017), and zero otherwise (2010, 2011, 2012, 
and 2013). Treatment group is an indicator variable equal to one for solid organ donors 
and zero for cornea-only donors. Results in the first (second) column include the full 
sample (exclude data from Wales). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
20 
	
Table 2. Outcome of Solid Organ Donation Process 
  
Eligible donors Approached for donation Family consent rate Successful donations 
Pre award 14.3% 64.3% 56.6% 68.7% 
Post award 15.8% 57.7% 60.4% 68.1% 
 
Notes. This table presents the proportion of eligible donors over audited deaths, the 
proportion of eligible donors whose family was approached for donation, the family 
consent rate, and the percentage of cases where solid organs were successfully retrieved 
following family consent. Averages for Pre 2013 award are computed over the years 
2011, 2012, and 2013, while averages for Post award are computed over the years 
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
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Table 3. Estimated Impact of Award on Unwillingness to Donate 
 Kidneys Pancreas Heart Lungs Liver 
Treatment group × Post award -0.079 -0.152** -0.132* -0.118 -0.143* 
 (0.079) (0.072) (0.071) (0.079) (0.079) 
Treatment group -2.512*** -1.242*** -1.225*** -1.334*** -1.819*** 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) 
Post award 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Constant 7.496*** 7.496*** 7.496*** 7.496*** 7.496*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 
R-squared  0.997 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.995 
 
Notes. This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of the (log) 
number of registered donors unwilling to donate a particular organ over the sample 
period 2010 to 2017. Post award is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
each year that the award system is in place (2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017), and zero 
otherwise (2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013). The respective Treatment group is indicated in 
the heading of each column. In all regressions, the control group is the (log) number of 
all registrants that are not prepared to donate their corneas. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
